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This article celebrates the recent decision of the High Court of Australia in 
Betfair Pty Ltd v Western Australia to revise the uniquely Australian 
concept of abridged proportionality that frames the Cole v Whitfield saving 
test for section 92 of the Australian Constitution. The critique that the 
article makes of abridged proportionality takes the form of a comparison 
with the continental European concept of robust proportionality. The 
comparison reveals that, unlike robust proportionality, abridged 
proportionality poses a twofold risk: one, that the test might save laws or 
measures that have a discriminatory effect on interstate trade and 
commerce if they have a purpose that is not protectionist; and, two, that the 
test might not save laws or measures that, in effect, legitimately regulate 
interstate trade and commerce if they have a purpose that is indeed 
protectionist. Thus, the article argues that abridged proportionality cannot 
preserve the Australian common market with the same level of strength that 
robust proportionality has. In conclusion, the article celebrates the fact that, 
since Betfair Pty Ltd v Western Australia, the High Court of Australia is 
now free to analyse not only the purpose but also the effect of any law or 
measure under challenge when it considers future cases on section 92. 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
Section 92 of the Australian Constitution guarantees the free movement of 
goods among the States and Territories of the Commonwealth. The text of 
the section reads: ‘trade, commerce, and intercourse … among the States … 
shall be absolutely free’. 
 
With the exception of the phrase ‘absolutely free’, the High Court of 
Australia has given the words of the section a clear and certain meaning. 
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However, the Court has had difficulty in interpreting the meaning of the 
phrase ‘absolutely free’. The difficulty with the phrase is that it is logically 
incomplete. The section does not state what it is from which interstate trade 
and commerce is to be absolutely free. Accordingly, the Court has not been 
able to read the phrase without any qualification. 
 
The interpretation of section 92 rapidly became a judicial labyrinth and 
remained chaotic until 1988 when the Court in Cole v Whitfield
1
 resolved to 
develop a definitive test for section 92. The Court developed a twofold test 
for section 92. 
 
The first test is discriminatory protectionism. It is an invalidity test. The test 
declares a law or measure invalid if it imposes a burden on interstate trade 
and commerce that is discriminatory in a protectionist sense. The second test 
is abridged proportionality. It is a saving test. The test declares a law or 
measure valid if it has a purpose that is not protectionist and any burden that 
it imposes on interstate trade and commerce is appropriate and adapted to the 
achievement of that purpose. 
 
Since 1988, academic commentators have considered the Cole v Whitfield 
twofold test as the definitive test for section 92. The Court, too, has 
considered the test as definitive and, two years later, confirmed the test in 
Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia.
2
 The Court has not revised the 
law on section 92 since then. However, I do not consider that the Cole v 
Whitfield test for section 92 is definitive. Indeed, this article is a doctrinal 
critique of the Cole v Whitfield saving test for section 92. 
 
I argue that the Court should revise the uniquely Australian concept of 
abridged proportionality that frames the Cole v Whitfield saving test for 
section 92. Discriminatory protectionism tests the invalidity of a law or 
measure under challenge for an alleged contravention of section 92. The test 
declares a law or measure invalid if it imposes a burden on interstate trade 
and commerce that is discriminatory in a protectionist sense. However, the 
Court retains the discretion to save that law or measure even if, in principle, it 
contravenes the section. Just as there is an invalidity test for section 92, there 
is also a saving test. 
 
My critique of abridged proportionality takes the form of a comparison with 
the continental European concept of robust proportionality. The comparison 
                                                 
1 (1988) 165 CLR 360.  
2 (1990) 169 CLR 436. 
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reveals that the test of abridged proportionality requires the Court to assess 
the suitability of the law or measure under challenge. In order to undertake 
that assessment, the Court needs only to analyse the purpose of the law or 
measure. In comparison, the test of robust proportionality requires the Court 
to assess not only the suitability but also the necessity of the law or measure 
and the balance between the freedom in section 92 and the restriction of that 
freedom by the law or measure. In order to undertake that assessment, the 
Court needs to analyse both the purpose and the effect of the law or measure 
under challenge. By implication, therefore, the test of abridged 
proportionality risks saving laws or measures that have a discriminatory 
effect against interstate trade and commerce if they have a purpose that is not 
protectionist. Accordingly, I argue that abridged proportionality cannot 
preserve the common market with the same level of strength that robust 
proportionality has. Furthermore, I argue that the emphasis of the test of 
abridged proportionality on the purpose of the law or measure under 
challenge is problematic because it implies a looser and instrumental use of 
facts.  
 
In conclusion, I argue that, instead of the concept of abridged proportionality 
as the Cole v Whitfield saving test for section 92, the Court should assess not 
only the suitability but also the necessity and balance of the law or measure 
under challenge. With a more robust concept of proportionality, the Court 
would analyse not only the purpose but also the effect of the law or measure. 
 
Thus, I argue for robust proportionality and criticise the reluctance of the 
Court to introduce the concept even though there is judicial precedent and 
academic commentary in support of its introduction. 
 
II THE COLE V WHITFIELD SAVING TEST FOR SECTION 92 
OF THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 
 
A Introduction 
 
I argue that the saving test developed by the High Court of Australia in Cole 
v Whitfield and Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia as a complement 
to discriminatory protectionism is doctrinally flawed. I base my argument on 
a claim that relates to the concept of abridged proportionality as a saving test 
for section 92 of the Australian Constitution. 
 
I claim that abridged proportionality fails to meet the federal purpose of a 
common market that the founders intended for section 92. The reason is 
twofold. One reason is that the test is based on an inadequate understanding 
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of proportionality. Another reason, which flows directly from the first, is that 
the test is concerned with the purpose and not with the effect of the law or 
measure under challenge. This approach implies that the Court can allow 
laws or measures that, nominally, have a constitutionally valid purpose even 
though, in effect, they violate the common market. 
 
 B The Rationale for a Saving Test for Section 92 of 
  the Australian Constitution 
 
The rationale for a saving test is obvious, even when it concerns, as in the 
case of section 92, the guarantee of a freedom. The rationale is the need for 
genuine regulation of interstate trade and commerce. Hinting at 
proportionality as the conceptual framework for a saving test for section 92, 
Patrick Smith explained in The Australian Law Journal the rationale for the 
genuine regulation of interstate trade and commerce notwithstanding that 
section 92 guarantees the free movement of goods: 
 
In … Australia … there is the understanding that national or State 
regulation must be permissible in certain circumstances even where such 
regulation hinders the free movement of goods. In examining the extent of 
permissible regulation we have seen that the common factor is the 
application of the concept of proportionality in [the] court’s saving test …
3
 
 
Accordingly, the Court in Cole v Whitfield felt obliged to acknowledge that 
the guarantee against protectionism is not absolute. Indeed, it recognised that, 
at times, there is a need for genuine regulation of intrastate and interstate 
trade and commerce. In this regard, the Court stated: 
 
A law which has as its real object the prescription of a standard for a 
product or a service or a norm of commercial conduct will not ordinarily be 
grounded in protectionism and will not be prohibited by s. 92. But if a law, 
which may be otherwise justified by reference to an object which is not 
protectionist, discriminates against inter-State trade or commerce in pursuit 
of that object in a way or to an extent which warrants characterisation of the 
law as protectionist, a court will be justified in concluding that it 
nonetheless offends s. 92.
4
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Patrick J Smith, ‘Free Movement of Goods within the EC and s 92 of the Australian 
Constitution’ (1998) 72 Australian Law Journal 465, 477 (emphasis added). 
4 Cole v Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 360, 408 (emphasis added). 
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 C The Origins of the Cole v Whitfield Saving Test 
 
The saving test for section 92 was sketched in Cole v Whitfield but it was 
only fully canvassed in Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia: 
 
Both Cole v Whitfield and Castlemaine Tooheys indicate that reasonable 
regulation is compatible with s 92, provided that the burden imposed on 
interstate trade is incidental and not disproportionate to the legitimate 
object to be achieved.
5
 
 
The saving test revolves around the concept of proportionality. The Court 
began to toy with the concept many years before Cole v Whitfield. 
Incidentally, one of its leading exponents on the Bench was Mason J. For 
example, in the 1980 case of Uebergang v Australian Wheat Board,
6
 Mason 
J, together with Stephen J, imagined a saving test that would reconcile 
otherwise infringing legislation with section 92 provided that the legislation 
be ‘no more restrictive than is reasonable in all the circumstances, due regard 
being had to the public interest’.
7
 Their Honours explained their concept of 
proportionality further: 
 
The evidence which we would regard as relevant in determining the validity 
of the present legislation would be such material as would enable the court 
to determine whether or not the restrictions which the legislation imposes 
upon interstate trade are no greater than are reasonably necessary in all 
the circumstances.
8
 
 
In 1983, three years after this influential judgment, Deane J formally 
introduced proportionality, as a distinct concept, into federal constitutional 
law.
9
 In Commonwealth v Tasmania,
10
 his Honour declared that, in order to 
be valid, a law or measure must be capable of being reasonably considered to 
be appropriate and adapted to achieving what is said to provide it with the 
character of a law or measure with respect to the particular subject matter. In 
                                                 
5 Gabriel Moens and John Trone, Lumb & Moens’ The Constitution of the Commonwealth of 
Australia Annotated (6th ed, 2001) 314, 325 (emphasis added). 
6 (1980) 145 CLR 266. 
7 Uebergang v Australian Wheat Board (1980) 145 CLR 266, 306 (Stephen and Mason JJ) 
(emphasis added). 
8 Ibid (emphasis added). 
9 Jeremy Kirk, ‘Constitutional Guarantees, Characterisation and the Concept of 
Proportionality’ (1997) 21 Melbourne University Law Review 1, 2. 
10 (1983) 158 CLR 1 (‘Tasmanian Dam Case’). 
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other words, reasonable proportionality is necessary between the designated 
purpose and the means that the law or measure embodies for achieving it:
11
 
 
Implicit in the requirement that a law be capable of being reasonably 
considered to be appropriate and adapted to achieving what is said to 
provide it with the character of a law with respect to external affairs is a 
need for there to be a reasonable proportionality between the designated 
purpose or object and the means which the law embodies for achieving or 
procuring it. Thus, to take an extravagant example, a law requiring that all 
sheep in Australia be slaughtered would not be sustainable as a law with 
respect to external affairs merely because Australia was a party to some 
international convention which required the taking of steps to safeguard 
against the spread of some obscure sheep disease which had been detected 
in sheep in a foreign country and which had not reached these shores.
12
 
 
Since 1983, ‘the proportionality doctrine has taken root and, indeed, extended 
its reach into the heartland of federal constitutional law’.
13
 These words, 
which Gummow J wrote in Minister for Resources v Dover Fisheries Pty 
Ltd,
14
 reflect on the state of the law after Cole v Whitfield and Castlemaine 
Tooheys Ltd v South Australia: 
 
[I]n Australia the proportionality doctrine has taken root and, indeed, 
extended its reach into the heartland of federal constitutional law. First, the 
rather special and ‘purposive’ nature of the legislative power with respect to 
external affairs in its application to existing and reasonably apprehended 
international obligations, led to its confinement to what may reasonably be 
regarded as appropriate means for implementation of the obligation: 
Commonwealth v Tasmania (the Tasmanian Dam case) (1983) 158 CLR 1 
at 172, 232-233, 259-261; Richardson v Forestry Commission (1988) 164 
CLR 261 at 295-296, 303, 311-312, 326, 336. Secondly, the doctrine has 
been applied to the operation of constitutional prohibitions or restraints 
upon the scope of legislative power, whether these prohibitions or restraints 
arise expressly, as with s 92 of the Constitution, (Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v 
South Australia (1990) 169 CLR 436 at 473-474) or impliedly (Nationwide 
News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1 at 50, 76-77, 94-95). Thirdly, the 
doctrine has been applied generally as a criterion of validity of provisions 
which fall outside the ‘core’ of the subject matters of certain of those 
legislative powers in s 51 which are not ‘purposive’ powers; see, as to the 
                                                 
11 Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 5-6 (Deane J). 
12 Ibid 260 (Deane J) (emphasis added). The quotation refers only to s 51(xxix) but the 
principle can extend to all laws, on all subjects. 
13 Minister for Resources v Dover Fisheries Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 565, 576 (Gummow J) 
(emphasis added). 
14 (1993) 43 FCR 565. 
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trade marks and corporations powers, Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 166 
CLR 79 at 99-100, and as to the conciliation and arbitration power, 
Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (supra) at 28-31 per Mason CJ, Dawson J 
contra at 88-89.
15
 
 
 D The Development of the Cole v Whitfield 
Saving Test 
 
Indeed, of particular significance to the development of the saving test for 
section 92 is the decision in Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia.
16
 
The case is important because it allowed the Court to develop the saving test 
that originated in Cole v Whitfield, thus completing its revolutionary revision 
of the law on section 92.
17
 Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia stands 
as authority for the principle that a law or measure that would otherwise be 
held to contravene section 92 may be held valid if it aims to achieve a non-
protectionist purpose and any burden that it imposes on interstate trade and 
commerce is appropriate and adapted to the achievement of that purpose.
18
 
 
It is important to refer to the words of the majority judgment in order to 
understand the concept of abridged proportionality that the Court developed 
in response to the Cole v Whitfield test of invalidity: 
 
In determining what is relevantly discriminatory in the context of s. 92, we 
must take account of the fundamental consideration that, subject to the 
Constitution, the legislature of a State has power to enact legislation for the 
well-being of the people of that State. In that context, the freedom from 
discriminatory burdens of a protectionist kind postulated by s. 92 does not 
deny to the legislature of a State power to enact legislation for the well-
being of the people of that State unless the legislation is relevantly 
discriminatory. Accordingly, interstate trade, as well as intrastate trade, 
must submit to such regulation as may be necessary or appropriate and 
adapted either to the protection of the community from a real danger or 
threat to its welfare or to the enhancement of its welfare.
19
 
 
Conversely: 
 
                                                 
15 Ibid. 
16 Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1990) 169 CLR 436. 
17 Gerard Carney, ‘The Re-Interpretation of Section 92: The Decline of Free Enterprise and the 
Rise of Free Trade’ (1991) 3 Bond Law Review 149, 159. 
18 Moens and Trone, above n 5, 324. 
19 Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1990) 169 CLR 436, 472 (Mason CJ, Brennan, 
Deane, Dawson, and Toohey JJ). 
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The fact that a law imposes a burden upon interstate trade and commerce 
that is not incidental or that is disproportionate to the attainment of the 
legitimate object of the law may show that the true purpose of the law is not 
to attain that object but to impose the impermissible burden.
20
 
 
 E Conclusion 
 
In summary, according to Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia, 
section 92 is not infringed where the ‘legislative measures … are appropriate 
and adapted to the resolution of those problems [and] any burden imposed on 
interstate trade was incidental and not disproportionate to their 
achievement’.
21
 Some years ago, Christopher Staker synthesised the saving 
test in formulaic, almost mathematical, terms in the Federal Law Review: 
 
[Section] 92 does require that State laws and measures which do impose 
burdens on interstate trade should never be adopted without purpose, and 
that the burdens they impose should not exceed that which is reasonably 
necessary to achieve that purpose.
22
 
 
III ABRIDGED PROPORTIONALITY AND ROBUST 
PROPORTIONALITY 
 
The passage from Staker above summarises with accuracy and simplicity the 
saving test that the High Court of Australia developed in Castlemaine 
Tooheys Ltd v South Australia as an antidote to a finding of discriminatory 
protectionism under the Cole v Whitfield test of invalidity. The saving test 
arose out of the need for the genuine regulation of interstate trade and 
commerce and was faithful to the original views of Mason J as proclaimed in 
Uebergang v Australian Wheat Board. 
 
However, notwithstanding its unarguable rationale and consistency with 
precedent, the saving test is doctrinally flawed. The passage from Staker 
above readily identifies the flaws. They are two in number. They relate to the 
concept of abridged proportionality that underpins the test and the subsequent 
concern that the test has with legislative purpose over and beyond legislative 
effect. 
 
                                                 
20 Ibid (emphasis added). 
21 Ibid (emphasis added). 
22 Christopher Staker, ‘Section 92 of the Constitution and the European Court of Justice’ 
(1990) 19 Federal Law Review 322, 343. See also Christopher Staker, ‘Free Movement of 
Goods in the EEC and Australia: A Comparative Study’ (1990) 10 Yearbook of European Law 
209. 
2008                                                             European Saving Test for Section 92 107 
The first flaw is that the saving test revolves around a concept of 
proportionality that, whilst tailored to fit around section 92 of the Australian 
Constitution, does not reflect the vision that the founders had for the section. 
The saving test is based on a very superficial concept of proportionality. This 
particular concept has been labelled as ‘abridged proportionality’. This 
understanding is nothing other than an abridgement of robust proportionality. 
 
 A Robust Proportionality 
 
To understand the distinction between abridged proportionality and robust 
proportionality, it is necessary to understand the theoretical considerations 
that lie behind the concept of proportionality itself. Proportionality is not a 
concept unique to Australian constitutional law. Rather, it is a concept of 
public law known to legal systems across the world, particularly European 
legal systems: 
 
Proportionality has … been applied in public law around the world. A so-
phisticated model of the concept … has emerged involving three aspects or 
levels. According to this doctrine, the government measure being reviewed 
must be suitable, necessary and not excessive in achieving its claimed end.
23
 
 
The passage above is from an article by Jeremy Kirk which was published in 
a 1997 issue of the Melbourne University Law Review. His article still 
remains the leading academic reference for Australian audiences on the 
concept of proportionality. As the passage indicates, proportionality is a 
three-levelled concept, involving the sub-concepts of suitability, necessity, 
and balancing: 
 
[T]hree preliminary steps must be taken before proportionality can be 
applied as a test of the validity of a government measure. Proportionality 
involves the balancing of competing interests. The competing interests in 
public law are the achievement of legitimate government ends and the 
protection of certain rights and interests from undue government regulation. 
The first two steps, therefore, are to identify each of these interests. The 
third step is to decide the level of intensity with which the test will be 
applied. For each level of proportionality it is possible to assess the 
requirements rigorously or deferentially.
24
 
 
Suitability serves as an objective test of purpose. If a measure is not an 
effective, appropriate or rational means of achieving the claimed end, then 
the measure cannot reasonably be characterised as having been made to 
                                                 
23 Kirk, above n 9, 4. 
24 Ibid 4-5. 
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achieve that end. Unless some other legitimate purpose emerges, the 
measure can be presumed to have been made predominantly for the 
impermissible purpose of restricting the relevant protected interest.
25
 
 
The second level of proportionality involves assessing whether the measure 
is necessary in the sense that there are no alternative practicable means 
available to achieve the same end which are less restrictive of the protected 
interest.
26
 
 
Sometimes named proportionality in the narrow or strict sense, or 
proportionality properly so called, it is the third level which lies at the heart 
of the concept. It requires that the measure is either excessive or 
disproportionate in the sense that the restrictions or detriments caused 
outweigh the importance of the end or the beneficial result achieved … On 
the detriment side, the extent of the restriction of a protected interest is 
relevant … What is actually balanced is the significance of the detriment, 
which is a function of the level of restriction and the importance of the 
interest affected … Similarly, on the other side of the equation, the 
importance of the end or value pursued by the measure has to be taken into 
account. So too does the benefit that the particular measure achieves in the 
context of that end.
27
 
 
In summary, proportionality involves the reconciliation of principles or 
interests which conflict or are in tension. In public law these interests are the 
achievement of legitimate government ends and the protection of certain 
rights or interests. In this context, proportionality has been seen and applied 
as a tripartite concept, even if the components have sometimes not been 
acknowledged or properly understood. Whilst the three levels overlap 
somewhat, they remain logically distinct.
28
 
 
Robust proportionality involves a cumulative sequence of analysis that tests 
the validity of the law or measure under challenge at three levels of 
assessment. These levels involve an inquiry into the ‘suitability’, ‘necessity’ 
and ‘balancing’ of that law or measure. This analysis seeks to establish 
whether a law or measure that a court has held to restrict some ‘protected 
interest’ should be declared valid notwithstanding its restriction. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 Ibid 6. 
26 Ibid 7. 
27 Ibid 8. 
28 Ibid 9. 
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1 Suitability 
 
First, analysis of the ‘suitability’ of the law or measure under challenge 
involves an inquiry into whether it is an effective, appropriate, or rational 
means of pursuing the purpose driving that law or measure.
29
 The law or 
measure will meet the first criterion of suitability if the court is satisfied that 
it pursues a legitimate purpose. Normally, the court will deem a purpose 
legitimate as long as it responds to any consideration other than a desire to 
restrict the protected interest. 
 
2 Necessity 
 
Second, analysis of the ‘necessity’ of the law or measure under challenge 
involves an inquiry into whether there is an alternative means of pursuing the 
legitimate purpose that is less restrictive but, nonetheless, reasonably 
available. That is, necessity assesses the possibility of legislative choice. The 
law or measure will meet the second criterion of necessity if the court is 
satisfied that it has adopted the least restrictive means to pursue the particular 
purpose.  
 
3 Balancing 
 
Third, analysis of the ‘balancing’ of the law or measure under challenge 
involves a somewhat more difficult inquiry. It involves the court undertaking 
a cost-benefit analysis whereby the relative significance of the protected 
interest is weighted against the legitimate purpose pursued by the law or 
measure and, thereby, delimits the ‘margin of appreciation’
30
 or ‘room for 
manoeuvre’ allowed to the legislature. The law or measure will meet this 
third criterion if the court is satisfied that it strikes a reasonable and 
                                                 
29 Interestingly, the level of assessment that robust proportionality associates with the 
suitability of the law or measure under challenge coincides, to some extent, with the first limb 
of the test for determining whether a law infringes the constitutionally implied freedom of 
political communication, namely, ‘does the law effectively burden freedom of communication 
about government or political matters either in its terms, operation or effect?’ (Lange v 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 567-8). The test, however, has a 
second, more difficult limb, which, shrouded under the veil of balancing, denotes a concern 
with purpose akin to abridged proportionality: ‘if the law effectively burdens that freedom, is 
the law reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end the fulfilment of which is 
compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of representative 
and responsible government …?’ (ibid 567-8). 
30 The ‘margin of appreciation’ is a principle of the European Court of Human Rights: 
Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 24 Eur Ct HR (ser A). 
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justifiable balance between the interest and purpose.
31
 This level of 
assessment contains the core distinction between abridged proportionality 
and robust proportionality. 
 
This concept of proportionality as involving a three-level inquiry (that is, into 
suitability, necessity, and balancing) is, for ease of reference, described by 
Amelia Simpson in the Federal Law Review as ‘robust proportionality’.
32
 
 
 B Abridged Proportionality 
 
Robust proportionality is in contrast to abridged proportionality: 
 
[T]he term ‘abridged proportionality’ [is used] to describe the narrower, 
alternative, conception in which proportionality analysis serves only to 
expose illegitimate legislative purposes.
33
 
 
This latter concept is uniquely Australian and, in my opinion, describes the 
saving test that the Court formulated in Cole v Whitfield and Castlemaine 
Tooheys Ltd v South Australia for section 92: 
 
Australian constitutional jurisprudence seems to sustain a parallel, 
competing, model of proportionality analysis. This other model views the 
‘primary, and perhaps only, role of proportionality [as being] to assess 
whether a law can be characterised as achieving the claimed legitimate 
purpose.’
34
 
 
Implicit, then, in the concept of abridged proportionality is the judicial 
concern with the purpose of the law or measure under challenge. Already in 
Cole v Whitfield, the Court was resolute that its concern was with the purpose 
or, in the words of the Court, ‘real object’ of the law or measure.
35
 
 
In Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia, the Court continued to be 
concerned with purpose but masked its concern with the introduction of the 
‘appropriate and adapted’ criterion
36
 as a kind of balancing exercise. Indeed, 
the Court concluded, at least seemingly, that if the effect of the law or 
measure under challenge is too extreme to achieve the purpose that the 
                                                 
31 Amelia Simpson, ‘Grounding the High Court’s Modern Section 92 Jurisprudence: The Case 
for Improper Purpose as the Touchstone’ (2005) 33 Federal Law Review 445, 456. 
32 Ibid 457. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid (citations omitted). 
35 Cole v Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 360, 408. 
36 Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1990) 169 CLR 436, 472. 
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legislature claims the law or measure to pursue, then such extremity may 
indicate that the law or measure pursues, in effect, another purpose 
altogether: 
 
The fact that a law imposes a burden upon interstate trade and commerce 
that is not incidental or that is disproportionate to the attainment of the 
legitimate object of the law may show that the true purpose of the law is not 
to attain that object but to impose the impermissible burden.
37
 
 
At least, in the above extract, the rationale of the Court seems to display 
some connexion between the suitability of the law under challenge and its 
balance, which is a level of assessment exclusive to robust proportionality. I 
do not believe, therefore, that the Court held the law under challenge in 
Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia invalid solely because of its 
purpose. Instead, I believe that the Court also considered the effect of the 
law. Almost twenty years later, the Court in Betfair Pty Ltd v Western 
Australia took the opportunity to confirm this: 
 
The promotion of litter control and of energy and resource conservation 
were propounded objects of the law which was held to fail in Castlemaine 
Tooheys. That law sought to achieve those objects by exempting refillable 
bottles from the requirement for the payment of a mandatory deposit. But 
this was no answer to the practical effect of the law which was held to be an 
impermissible discrimination of a protectionist kind against interstate 
trade.
38
 
 
I suggest, in summary, that the Court intertwined purpose and effect. In other 
words, the fact that the law under challenge had a protectionist effect 
indicated that its stated purpose was not its ‘true purpose’. However, the 
‘balancing’ level of assessment that robust proportionality calls for is a 
different exercise from the application of the ‘appropriate and adapted’ 
criterion that now comprises the second element of the saving test for section 
92. 
 
The two criteria are different because, insofar as the ‘appropriate and 
adapted’ criterion is concerned, the Court refuses to assess the desirability of 
the law or measure under challenge. Desirability, as a level of assessment, is 
the core distinction between abridged proportionality and robust 
                                                 
37 Ibid (emphasis added). 
38 Betfair Pty Ltd v Western Australia [2008] HCA 11 (27 March 2008) (Gleeson CJ, 
Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Crennan, and Kiefel JJ) [47] (emphasis added). For a review of this 
case, please refer to the postscript below. 
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proportionality. That is, the Court neither assesses the possibility of 
legislative choice
 
nor delimits the margin of appreciation allowed to the 
legislature. In Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia, the Court 
expressly acknowledged its refusal thus: ‘[t]he question whether a particular 
legislative enactment is a necessary or even a desirable solution to a 
particular problem is in large measure a political question best left for 
resolution to the political process.’
39
 
 
Unfortunately, this masked judicial concern with the purpose of the law or 
measure under challenge is to the detriment of any judicial inquiry into the 
actual effect of the law or measure. Undue attention to the purpose of the law 
or measure under challenge is one of the two difficulties that the current 
saving test for section 92 raises. 
 
IV PROPORTIONALITY AND THE FEDERAL PURPOSE OF 
SECTION 92 OF THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 
 
Before I discuss this difficulty, it is necessary to understand the flawed 
understanding of proportionality that the majority judgment in Castlemaine 
Tooheys Ltd v South Australia displays, both relative to the concept of robust 
proportionality and in light of the federal purpose of section 92 of the 
Australian Constitution. The rationale against abridged proportionality is not 
complicated. It revolves around the idea that abridged proportionality may 
validate laws or measures that are seemingly compatible with the common 
market, insofar as their claimed purpose is concerned, but that, in effect, 
compromise the absolute freedom of interstate trade and commerce that 
section 92 guarantees. Therefore, in my opinion, a law or measure should be 
invalid if alternative non-discriminatory means to pursue the legitimate 
purpose are possible.
40
 Discrimination is inadmissible irrespective of purpose, 
aim, or intent: 
 
Where the rationale underpinning a non-discrimination norm is the pursuit 
of economic wellbeing it makes good sense that unintended protectionist 
discrimination be caught within the norm’s scope, for the relevant harm is 
not lessened by the absence of intent.
41
 
 
Robust proportionality does not have the flaws of abridged proportionality. 
This fuller concept of proportionality represents a solid foundation for a 
saving test that would reflect the vision of a common market that the 
                                                 
39 Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1990) 169 CLR 436, 472-3 (emphasis added). 
40 Kirk, above n 9, 20. 
41 Simpson, above n 31, 477 (emphasis added). 
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founders had and entrusted to section 92. It looks beyond the purpose of the 
law or measure under challenge into the effect that it actually has on the 
common market and on interstate competition: 
 
The robust proportionality account of section 92 accepts that a finding of 
discriminatory protectionist purpose will be a sufficient condition for 
invalidity. But the account does not regard such a finding as a necessary 
condition for invalidity – some laws will transgress section 92 even in the 
absence of improper purpose. In particular, a robust proportionality account 
presumes that the High Court sees unintended protectionist discrimination 
as potentially invalid under section 92.
42
 
 
The founders intended that the effect of a law or measure should warrant the 
same consideration as its purpose. Proof of their intention is that the pre-1900 
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States of America on the 
Commerce Clause in the United States Constitution influenced the Australian 
founders when they deliberated the terms of section 92
43
 and those decisions 
did gave greater weight to effect than to purpose. For example, in the United 
States case of Minnesota v Barber,
44
 Harlan J stated: 
 
A burden imposed by a State upon interstate commerce is not to be 
sustained simply because the statute imposing it applies alike to the people 
of all the States, including the people of the State enacting such statute. … 
The people of Minnesota have as much right to protection against the 
enactments of that State, interfering with the freedom of commerce among 
the States, as have the people of other States. Although this statute is not 
avowedly, or in terms, directed against the bringing into Minnesota of the 
products of other States, its necessary effect is to burden or obstruct 
commerce with other States, as involved in the transportation into that State, 
for purposes of sale there, of all fresh beef, veal, mutton, lamb or pork, 
however free from disease may have been the animals from which it was 
taken.
45
 
 
Thus, inspired by Minnesota v Barber and its precedent, Guy v Baltimore,
46
 
Henry Parkes, then Premier of New South Wales, stated on 10 February 1890 
at the preliminary Australasian Federation Conference: 
                                                 
42 Ibid 458 (emphasis added). 
43 J A La Nauze, ‘A Little Bit of Lawyers’ Language: The History of “Absolutely Free” 1890-
1900’ in A W Martin (ed) Essays in Australian Federation (1969) 57, 69. 
44 (1890) 136 US 313. 
45 Minnesota v Barber (1890) 136 US 313, 326 (Harlan J) (emphasis added). Interestingly, in 
one of the first cases on s 92, Barton J referred to the effect of the law under challenge in 
Duncan v Queensland (1916) 22 CLR 556, 598. 
46 (1879) 100 US 434. 
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The case seems to set at rest, in the most emphatic manner, what is 
sometimes disputed – the question of existence of entire freedom throughout 
the territory of the United States. As the members of the Conference know, 
she has created a tariff of a very severe, and in some cases almost 
prohibitive character against the outside world; but as between New York 
and Massachusetts, and as between Connecticut and Pennsylvania, there is 
no custom house and no tax collector. Between any two of the States – 
indeed from one end of the States to the other – the country is as free as the 
air in which the swallow flies. We cannot too fully bear in mind this 
doctrine of the great republic, a doctrine supported in the most convincing 
manner by the case to which I have alluded.
47
 
 
Earning his title as the ‘Father of Federation’, Parkes submitted a draft of the 
resolutions that he believed delegates ought to put before the National 
Australasian Convention. His first resolution, ‘which by taking pride of place 
shows the importance which he attached to making Australia one “free-trade” 
unit’,
48
 read: 
 
That the trade and intercourse between the Federated Colonies, whether by 
means of land carriage or coastal navigation, shall be free … from all 
restrictions whatsoever, except such regulations as may be necessary for the 
conduct of business.
49
 
 
As the earliest recorded expression of the federal purpose of section 92, this 
resolution is powerful evidence of the vision of a national market for regional 
produce that the founders projected on section 92. Robust proportionality 
secures that vision of a common market. 
 
Like Kirk, therefore, I argue that robust proportionality represents the 
strongest conceptual foundation for a test of legitimate restriction. Suitability, 
necessity, and balancing should be the criteria that form the basis of the 
saving test for section 92: 
                                                 
47 Official Record of the Proceedings and Debates of the Australasian Federation Conference, 
Melbourne, 10 February 1890, 46 (Henry Parkes) (emphasis added). 
48 F R Beasley, ‘The Commonwealth Constitution: Section 92 – Its History in the Federal 
Conventions’ (1948-50) 1 University of Western Australia Annual Law Review 97, 98. 
49 Henry Parkes, Fifty Years in the Making of Australian History (1892) vol 2, 359 (emphasis 
added). The recognition that this resolution makes of the need for genuine regulation of 
intrastate and interstate trade and commerce contradicts the opinion of Sawer who once 
observed that ‘Parkes admired laissez-faire as much as he did free trade’ (Geoffrey Sawer, 
‘Constitutional Law’ in George W Paton (ed), The Commonwealth of Australia: The 
Development of its Laws and Constitution (1952) 71, 76). In his opinion, ‘most of the 
Founders were also devotees of “free trade” in the more extensive sense of minimum 
regulation for commercial activities’ (Michael Coper, Encounters with the Australian 
Constitution (1988) 273-4). 
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First, each of the three levels of the concept serves a justified role in this 
context. The restriction of constitutional guarantees can only be supported if 
a measure is made in pursuance of a genuine competing legitimate purpose. 
The first level of proportionality tests whether a measure can be 
characterised as pursuing such a purpose. If it is accepted that a 
constitutionally protected interest can sometimes be overridden by 
competing public interests, but that not just any public interest or any set of 
circumstances can justify such restriction, then the need for a balancing test 
becomes plain. … This need to draw a balance is given effect by third level 
proportionality. The second level of proportionality reflects the view that, 
even if on balance the restriction is justified, to accord full and substantive 
respect to the guarantee demands that it be restricted as little as possible. A 
measure will therefore be invalid if alternative practicable means of 
achieving the legitimate end are available. 
 
Secondly, a proportionality test facilitates the provision of clear and 
detailed reasons for any decision as to a law’s validity. … The exact 
objection to a restriction is more likely to emerge from a reasoned 
application of proportionality. … 
 
Thirdly, the test is sufficiently flexible to cope with any type of constitutional 
guarantee or any range of circumstances.
50
 
 
The virtues of robust proportionality are universally recognised. Proof of its 
wide acceptance is the adoption of three-levelled proportionality by the 
European Court of Justice. Indeed, proportionality is, in origin, a principle of 
German public law. The European Court of Justice acknowledged it as a 
general principle of European Community law in Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und 
Futtermittel (Solange I),
51
 in which Advocate General de Lamothe stated that 
‘the individual should not have his freedom of action limited beyond the 
degree necessary in the public interest’.
52
 The European Court of Justice 
subsequently expanded the principle of proportionality in R v Minister of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex parte Fedesa.
53
 The academic consensus 
is that the principle of proportionality, as a general principle of European 
Community law, comprises a test of suitability, a test of necessity, and a test 
of desirability.
54
 Notably, the European Court of Human Rights,
55
 Supreme 
                                                 
50 Kirk, above n 9, 19-20 (emphasis added). 
51 (C-11/10) [1970] ECR 1125. 
52 Ibid 1147 (emphasis added). 
53 (C-331/88) [1990] ECR I-4023. 
54 See Gráinne de Búrca, ‘The Principle of Proportionality and its Application in EC Law’ 
(1993) 13 Yearbook of European Law 105, 113. See also Takis Tridimas, The General 
Principles of EC Law (1999) 91-3. 
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Court of Canada,
56
 and Hong Kong Court of Appeal
57
 have followed suit and 
adopted robust proportionality.
58
 
 
Unfortunately, the High Court of Australia has been reluctant to adopt robust 
proportionality: 
 
It is unfortunate that … no member of the High Court has yet clearly 
recognised the three level nature of proportionality. The structured 
approach of proportionality represents a beneficial addition to Australian 
constitutional law in this context.
59
 
 
This reluctance is somewhat odd given that, in the 1970s, cases on section 92 
witnessed attempts by several judges of the Court to develop an Australian 
approach to the three levels of assessment that characterise robust 
proportionality. For example, in Uebergang v Australian Wheat Board, 
Stephen and Mason JJ emphasised that their imagined saving test for section 
92 required balancing the adverse effect on interstate trade and commerce 
with the ‘need which is felt for the regulation’.
60
 
 
In addition, their Honours indicated that a court could indeed declare the law 
or measure under challenge unconstitutional if there were alternative and 
practicable means of pursuing the purpose with a less adverse effect on 
interstate trade and commerce. It is evident from their judgment that Stephen 
and Mason JJ were thinking in terms of the second and third levels of robust 
proportionality.
61
 
 
Academic commentators too have expressed support for a more robust 
concept of proportionality as the doctrinal basis for the saving test. For 
example, some years ago, Leslie Zines advocated the third level of 
assessment that balances suitability against necessity: 
 
While the court has declared that it is not its concern to determine the social 
benefits or otherwise of legislation that impinges on interstate trade, it is 
clear that a degree of balancing of social interests, in some cases at any 
rate, is inevitable.
62
 
                                                                                                                    
55 Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 24 Eur Court HR (ser A) [42]-[50]. 
56 R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103, 138-40. 
57 R v Sin Yau Ming [1992] 1 HKCLR 127, 145. 
58 Kirk, above n 9, 4. 
59 Ibid 20 (emphasis added). 
60 Uebergang v Australian Wheat Board (1980) 145 CLR 266, 306 (Stephen and Mason JJ). 
61 Kirk, above n 9, 13. 
62 Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (4th ed, 1997) 152 (emphasis added). 
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Zines, thus, regretted the refusal of the Court to assess the desirability of the 
law or measure under challenge as tantamount to a refusal to undertake the 
cost-benefit analysis implicit in the third level of assessment that defines 
robust proportionality. 
 
Similarly, albeit not necessarily invoking the elements of suitability and 
necessity, Michael Coper defended the need to balance when he recognised 
that ‘in the case of section 92 there is no escape from the need to strike a 
balance between competing national and local interests.’
63
 Sadly, the 
‘appropriate and adapted’ criterion of Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South 
Australia is not a balancing exercise. It is nothing but a formula for abridged 
proportionality because it avoids assessing the desirability of the law or 
measure under challenge. 
 
Against such judicial precedent and academic commentary, it is unfortunate 
that the Court in Cole v Whitfield and later in Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v 
South Australia rejected the three-level understanding of proportionality. In 
fact, reflecting on the evolution of the concept of proportionality in Australia, 
Kirk expressed his regret that Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia 
halted the promising progress made up to, and including, Uebergang v 
Australian Wheat Board, towards the development of robust proportionality: 
 
The s 92 cases show that proportionality has deep roots in Australia. By 
1980 a test for legitimate restriction of s 92 had evolved which incorporated 
both the second and third levels of the concept (which in turn presuppose 
the first level). In one sense, therefore, Castlemaine added little but the 
label. Indeed, in so far as the court in that case did not … articulate the 
different aspects of proportionality, the Castlemaine test is arguably less 
clear than the approach of Stephen and Mason JJ in Uebergang.
64
 
 
Not all is lost. There is still hope that the Court will revise its abridged 
understanding of proportionality as the doctrinal basis for the section 92 
saving test and proceed to fortify it with the three levels of assessment that 
underpin robust proportionality. As recently as 2004, in the case of 
Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (Vic),
65
 a 
majority of the Court approached a constitutional non-discrimination norm 
similar to the norm that I propose for section 92 in a way seemingly 
                                                 
63 Michael Coper, Commonwealth of Australia, The Curious Case of the Callow Crayfish: The 
New Law Relating to Section 92 of the Australian Constitution, Parliamentary Library 
Discussion Paper No 1 (1989-90) 2, 24 (emphasis added). 
64 Kirk, above n 9, 15-6. 
65 (2004) 220 CLR 388. 
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supportive of the robust proportionality approach.
66
 That is, the Court 
appeared to demonstrate a greater concern with the effect of the law or 
measure under challenge than is customary. Indeed, signals such as those 
coming from Permanent Trustee Australia v Commissioner of State Revenue 
(Vic) have been picked up by Simpson who has noted that ‘the High Court 
has, in various constitutional contexts, introduced a concept of 
proportionality inspired by the three-level doctrine prevalent in European 
Courts.’
67
 
 
V PURPOSE VERSUS EFFECT 
 
I mentioned earlier that the test of legitimate restriction that the High Court of 
Australia developed in Cole v Whitfield and Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South 
Australia as an antidote to a finding of discriminatory protectionism has two 
doctrinal flaws. 
 
 A Introduction 
 
One flaw is that the legitimate restriction test is far too weak to preserve the 
common market that the founders devised as the federal purpose of section 
92 of the Australian Constitution. After all, it is a mere abridgment of the 
concept of robust proportionality. It is an abridgment because the test stops at 
the first level of assessment, pertaining to the suitability of the law or 
measure under challenge, and does not continue to the second and third levels 
of assessment, involving necessity and balancing. In truth, this flaw merges, 
almost indistinguishably, with the second of the two doctrinal flaws that lie at 
the core of the current saving test for section 92. The reason for this second 
flaw, like for the first, is the inconsistency of abridged proportionality with 
the federal purpose intended by the founders for section 92. 
 
This flaw, which directly stems from the first, is that the test is concerned 
with the purpose and not so much with the effect of the law or measure under 
challenge. In practice, this approach implies that a law or measure that has a 
purpose that is not discriminatory in a protectionist kind can be held to 
comply with section 92 even though the effect of the law or measure violates 
the common market.  
 
 
                                                 
66 Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (Vic) (2004) 220 CLR 
388. See also Simpson, above n 31, 462. 
67 Simpson, above n 31, 456. 
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 B Abridged Proportionality and its Concern with 
Legislative Purpose 
 
The purpose-driven dynamic evident in the saving test introduced in Cole v 
Whitfield and later ratified in Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia is 
integral to the concept of abridged proportionality. Abridged proportionality 
offers a reading of section 92 that is not robust enough to uphold the vision 
that the founders had of a common market absolutely free from 
discrimination of any kind. There is, therefore, a very strong need to 
denounce the fatally flawed mode of reasoning that impregnates the current 
saving test for section 92. 
 
1 Judicial Construction of Legislative Purpose 
 
Such is the concern of the Court to look into the purpose of the law or 
measure under challenge that it is prepared to go to the length, absurd in my 
opinion, of reading a purpose where none is apparent from the law or 
measure itself. That is, the current saving test for section 92 is stretched by 
the Court to the limit so as to try to draw a purpose from the law or measure 
under challenge, even if no purpose is expressed: 
 
In the presumably certain absence of any declaration in legislation that it 
had a protectionist purpose, it would be necessary … to consider whether 
such a purpose could reasonably be inferred from the terms of the 
legislation and all relevant circumstances at the time of the decision.
68
 
 
This persistent reference to the purpose of the law or measure blinds the 
Court to the effect of the law even where the purpose is not readily apparent. 
This is a somewhat curious and paradoxical circumstance because, in the end, 
the reality is that it is only the effect of the law or measure that can be 
empirically quantified. Unlike purpose, effect is not measured in words but in 
actions. Effect is palpable and tangible. Purpose is not. 
 
I acknowledge that effect could be an evidentiary question of some difficulty 
to answer. Indeed, future section 92 cases are likely to raise highly complex 
problems of proof concerning the factual operation of the law or measure 
under challenge: 
 
The [High] Court has not fully addressed the fact finding processes by 
which factual discrimination or protectionism must be proved, at least 
                                                 
68 Dennis J Rose, ‘Cole v Whitfield: “Absolutely Free” Trade?’ in H P Lee and George 
Winterton (eds), Australian Constitutional Landmarks (2003) 335, 346 (emphasis added). 
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where the issues are contested. In Cole v Whitfield and Castlemaine 
Tooheys, the Court was fortunate to have agreed statement of facts between 
the parties.
69
 
 
In other words, when the allegation made before the Court is that the law or 
measure under challenge is protectionist because it discriminates in its 
operation, the probability that the parties to the dispute will submit an agreed 
statement of facts is, at best, negligible.
70
 
 
Inevitably, without reference to an agreed statement of facts, the Court will 
encounter a laborious, difficult, and definitely unenviable fact-finding 
process, which it is neither sufficiently experienced nor sufficiently resourced 
to undertake. Nonetheless, while the effect of a law or measure could be, in a 
few cases, an evidentiary question that is difficult to answer, it is, ultimately, 
measurable in real terms. Purpose, however, can never transcend a mere 
verbal formula. Therefore, academic commentators have suggested a number 
of solutions to the evidentiary problem that the determination of effect can 
present. 
 
One suggestion relates to the type of evidence that the Court should require 
parties to submit in section 92 cases. Staker has argued that the problem of 
establishing protectionism would be solved if the Court insisted on hearing 
expert evidence about relevant economic concepts such as, for example, the 
cross-elasticity of demand between competing interstate goods: 
 
One solution might be to respond by forging appropriately complex 
economic tests, and require comprehensive expert evidence to be given on 
the actual ‘cross-elasticity of demand’ between the interstate product 
affected by a law and the domestic product alleged to be in competition with 
it.
71
 
 
Expert evidence given by both academic and practising economists would be 
of much assistance to the Court since section 92 cases revolve around 
                                                 
69 Michael Coper, ‘Freedom of Interstate Trade and Commerce’, in Tony Blackshield, Michael 
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inherently economic concepts such as protectionism and competitive 
advantage: 
 
Given that the identification of a market is logically antecedent to any 
examination of market advantage, then, as experience in relation to Part IV 
of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) illustrates, the importance of the role 
of economic expertise in assisting the Court cannot be gainsaid.
72
 
 
Given the lack of technical expertise among members of the Court, academic 
commentators have put forward further solutions in relation to the type of 
forum where judges can best hear expert evidence: 
 
[T]he difficulties which attend the reception of evidence germane to the 
question of whether s 92 has been infringed leads one to consider whether s 
92 cases should be heard by either a single High Court Justice at first 
instance or remitted to the Federal Court under s 44(1) of the Judiciary Act 
1903 (Cth).
73
 
 
A similar, but perhaps more sensible, solution has been suggested in several 
quarters, including the Constitutional Commission of 1988.
74
 It calls for the 
restoration of the Inter-State Commission. Coper has been its staunchest 
advocate: 
 
The link [between the decision in Cole v Whitfield and the potential role of 
the Inter-State Commission] is simply this: the proper resolution of issues 
that turn on the presence or absence of [discriminatory protectionism] 
against interstate trade requires thorough factual investigation and the 
Constitution contemplates that the Inter-State Commission will play an 
appropriate role.
75
 
 
As the above passage mentions, the Inter-State Commission is indeed 
established by the Constitution, more particularly by section 101. Various 
academic commentators have proposed that the Inter-State Commission, 
which the Commonwealth government last dissolved in 1989, could be 
responsible for the resolution of factual questions involving the often 
                                                 
72 Bell, above n 70, 246 (emphasis added). 
73 Ibid 250 (emphasis added). 
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75 Michael Coper, ‘The Second Coming of the Fourth Arm: The Role and Functions of the 
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            DEAKIN LAW REVIEW                                                                                           VOLUME 13 NO 1 122
technical and voluminous economic evidence that parties submit before the 
Court in section 92 cases.
76
  
 
The determination of the effect of a law or measure under challenge can, as I 
have explained, be a problem. However, it is not, as I have also explained, a 
problem without solutions. In my opinion, therefore, the bigger problem 
would be the risk to the integrity of the common market posed by the 
continuation of a saving test that is concerned with the purpose and not with 
the effect of the law or measure under challenge. Such is its concern for 
purpose that the saving test risks saving laws or measures that have a 
discriminatory effect against interstate trade and commerce if they have a 
purpose that is not protectionist. 
 
2 Evidence from the Cases 
 
Proof of the judicial concern for purpose, to the detriment of effect, is 
widespread in the judgments from the two now leading cases on section 92. 
For example, the joint judgment that the Court handed down in Cole v 
Whitfield includes numerous remarks indicative of a concern with the 
purpose of the law or measure under challenge. The Court itself indicated that 
its concern was with the ‘real object’, not the effect, of the law or measure.
77
 
 
Unable to find discrimination in a protectionist sense, the Court in Cole v 
Whitfield was content with evidence that ‘no discriminatory protectionist 
purpose appears on the face of the [impugned] law.’
78
 As absurd a premise as 
it may seem, to the Court, protectionist effect can be tantamount to 
constitutional validity.
79
 
 
The theory of section 92 that the Court advanced in Cole v Whitfield was 
affirmed two years later. Indeed, Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia 
confirmed the suspicion that the preceding case aroused, that the Court 
actually does require the law or measure under challenge to have an 
identifiable protectionist purpose before it is invalidated as being 
discriminatory in a protectionist sense: 
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[W]here a law on its face is apt to secure a legitimate object but its effect is 
to impose a discriminatory burden upon interstate trade as against intrastate 
trade, the existence of reasonable non-discriminatory alternative means of 
securing that legitimate object suggests that the purpose of the law is … to 
effect a form of prohibited discrimination. There is also some room for a 
comparison, if not a balancing, of means and objects in the context of s 92. 
The fact that a law imposes a burden upon interstate trade and commerce 
that is not incidental or that is disproportionate to the attainment of the 
legitimate object of the law may show that the true purpose of the law is not 
to attain that object but to impose the impermissible burden.
80
 
 
The passage above demonstrates that the emphasis on purpose is attributable 
to the application of abridged proportionality as a saving test for section 92. 
Indeed, there are various passages in the majority judgment in Castlemaine 
Tooheys Ltd v South Australia that reveal the over-zealous concern that the 
Court has for purpose as a measure of the legitimacy of legislative and 
executive regulation of interstate trade and commerce. This emphasis on 
purpose is in contrast to the robust concept of proportionality. 
 
One, if perhaps indirect, criticism of the concern for purpose that the Court 
shows in its application of the saving test for section 92 can be found in the 
minority judgment that Gaudron and McHugh JJ handed down in 
Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia. Their Honours rejected as 
incomplete the saving test favoured by the majority. In the view of Gaudron 
and McHugh JJ, abridged proportionality, driven as it is by purpose, may not 
filter laws or measures whose ‘practical effect is protectionist’ if their 
purpose is not protectionist: 
 
Thus, if there is no inequality or relevant difference between the subject 
matter of interstate trade and the subject matter of intrastate trade, a law 
which is appropriate and adapted to an objective and burdens interstate 
trade only incidentally and not disproportionately to that objective will, in 
our view, offend against s 92 if its practical effect is protectionist – 
particularly if there exist alternative means involving no or a lesser burden 
on interstate trade.
81
 
 
It is clear that Gaudron and McHugh JJ believed that section 92 should catch 
laws and measures that may not be protectionist in purpose but are, 
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nonetheless, protectionist in effect. In the words of one academic 
commentator, ‘section 92 must be presumed to extend beyond intentional 
burdens and also to target burdens that are inadvertent yet unjustified.’
82
 
Simply, Gaudron and McHugh JJ wished to make the point that section 92 is 
also concerned with unintended effects. The fact that their Honours felt it 
necessary to differentiate their approach from that followed by the majority 
reveals that the saving test for section 92 used by the majority is concerned 
only with inferring the purpose of the law or measure under challenge. 
 
 C A Looser and Instrumental Use of Facts 
 
The saving test for section 92 is overly concerned with the purpose of the law 
or measure under challenge as the criterion of constitutional legitimacy. A 
saving test that focuses on purpose alone implies a ‘looser, instrumental, use 
of facts’ that a saving test that focuses on purpose and effect.
83
 That is, with 
such a saving test, the Court can afford to disregard the attestable, even 
perhaps protectionist, realities of the case and, instead, simply rely on the 
purpose evident on the face of the law or measure under challenge as the only 
indispensable fact. Consequently, the Court does not have the capacity to 
tailor decisions to the particularities of the real world. A saving test that 
validates laws or measures that do not have a protectionist purpose but that, 
nonetheless, have a protectionist effect is nothing but absurd.
84
 The founders 
definitely did not contemplate such absurdity. Through section 92, the 
founders sought an efficient common market free from discrimination against 
interstate trade and commerce, irrespective of whether that discrimination 
was deliberate or not. 
 
 D Conclusion 
 
I argue that abridged proportionality as a saving test for section 92 is 
doctrinally flawed. It is flawed because it does not reflect the vision that the 
founders had of a national market for local produce. Abridged proportionality 
lacks the second and third levels of assessment that make the concept of 
proportionality robust, and is simply concerned with the purpose of the law 
or measure under challenge. As important a consideration as it may be, 
purpose is only one side of the coin. The other side of the coin, namely the 
effect of the law or measure under challenge, can be an equally disruptive 
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variable with the potential to hamper the absolute freedom of interstate trade 
and commerce that section 92 guarantees. 
 
The founders envisioned a common market free from the influence of 
legalistic technicalities and semantic nuances. The distinction between 
purpose and effect is largely doctrinal and, as such, elusive to measurable 
standards. Yet, to ignore effect as a consideration is an open invitation to the 
State and Commonwealth governments to develop laws and measures that, in 
form, are compatible with the common market but, in substance, are 
inconsistent with it. Realistically, assessment of the suitability of the law or 
measure can only uncover the purpose of the law or measure. To uncover the 
effect of the law or measure, its necessity must be assessed and then balanced 
against its suitability. Only, robust proportionality can do this. 
 
VI CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, my doctrinal critique of abridged proportionality takes the 
form of a comparison of it with robust proportionality. The comparison 
reveals that the test of abridged proportionality requires the High Court of 
Australia to assess the suitability of the law or measure under challenge. In 
order to undertake that assessment, despite the contrary implication of the 
‘appropriate and adapted’ criterion of Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South 
Australia, the Court needs only to analyse the purpose of the law or measure. 
By contrast, the test of robust proportionality requires the Court to assess not 
only the suitability but also the necessity of the law or measure and the 
balance between the freedom in section 92 of the Australian Constitution and 
the restriction of that freedom by the law or measure. In order to undertake 
that assessment, the Court needs to analyse both the purpose and the effect of 
the law or measure under challenge. By implication, therefore, the test of 
abridged proportionality risks saving laws or measures that have a 
discriminatory effect on interstate trade and commerce if they have a purpose 
that is not protectionist. Accordingly, I argue that abridged proportionality 
cannot preserve the common market with the same level of strength that 
robust proportionality has. Furthermore, I argue that the concern of the test of 
abridged proportionality with the purpose of the law or measure under 
challenge is problematic because it implies a looser and instrumental use of 
facts. Thus, I argue for robust proportionality and criticise the reluctance of 
the Court to introduce the concept even though there is judicial precedent and 
academic commentary in support of its introduction. 
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VII POSTSCRIPT 
 
Twenty years ago, in Cole v Whitfield, the High Court of Australia resolved 
to develop a definitive test for section 92 of the Australian Constitution. The 
Court further developed the Cole v Whitfield test in three cases between 1988 
and 1990, namely, Bath v Alston Holdings Pty Ltd,
85
 Castlemaine Tooheys 
Ltd v South Australia, and Barley Marketing Board (NSW) v Norman.
86
 
 
The Court did not again apply the Cole v Whitfield test until earlier this year 
when, on 27 March 2008, the Court handed down its judgment in Betfair Pty 
Ltd v Western Australia: 
 
All parties accept as the source of present doctrine respecting s 92 what was 
said 20 years ago in Cole v Whitfield and further developed and applied in 
the authorities decided shortly thereafter, namely Bath v Alston Holdings 
Pty Ltd, Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia and Barley Marketing 
Board (NSW) v Norman.
87
 
 
The Court not only applied the test but also developed it. Curiously, the 
reasons for its development read like a response to this article and its critique 
of the Cole v Whitfield saving test for section 92. 
 
This article argued that, despite its acceptance of abridged proportionality as 
the saving test, the Court should assess not only the suitability but also the 
necessity and balance of the law or measure under challenge. Through a more 
robust concept of proportionality, the Court would analyse not only the 
purpose but also the effect of the law or measure.  
 
In Betfair Pty Ltd v Western Australia, the Court formally incorporated the 
criterion of ‘reasonable necessity’ into the ‘appropriate and adapted’ criterion 
that the Court had expressed in Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia: 
 
[T]he ‘appropriate and adapted’ criterion expressed in Castlemaine Tooheys 
… must give significant weight to the considerations referred to earlier in 
these reasons … These involve the constraint upon market forces operating 
within the national economy by legal barriers protecting the domestic 
producer or trader against the out-of-State producer or trader, with 
consequent prejudice to domestic customers of that out-of-State producer or 
trader. They suggest the application here, as elsewhere in constitutional, 
                                                 
85 (1988) 165 CLR 411. 
86 (1990) 171 CLR 182. 
87Betfair Pty Ltd v Western Australia [2008] HCA 11 (27 March 2008) (Gleeson CJ, 
Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Crennan, and Kiefel JJ), [47] (emphasis added). 
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public and private law, of a criterion of ‘reasonable necessity’. For 
example, in North Eastern Dairy Co Ltd v Dairy Industry Authority of NSW, 
Mason J said:  
 
‘As the defendant has failed to show that the discriminatory mode of 
regulation selected is necessary for the protection of public health, it 
is in my judgment not a reasonable regulation of the interstate trade 
in pasteurized milk.’ 
 
His Honour also referred to remarks in a similar vein by the Privy Council 
in The Commonwealth v Bank of NSW. 
 
That view of the matter should be accepted as the doctrine of the Court. It is 
consistent with the explanation given in Cole v Whitfield of the justification 
of the total prohibition in the Tasmanian legislation on the sale of all 
undersized crayfish, irrespective of origin, as supplied by its objective of the 
conservation of the stock of Tasmanian crayfish. The Court held that the 
prohibition was a ‘necessary means of enforcing the prohibition against the 
catching of undersized crayfish in Tasmanian waters’ because that State 
‘cannot undertake inspections other than random inspections and the local 
crayfish are indistinguishable from those imported from South Australia’.
88
 
 
On the basis of this reformulation of the saving test for section 92, the Court 
concluded: 
 
[T]he prohibitory State law is not proportionate; it is not appropriate and 
adapted to the propounded legislative object. … [I]t cannot be found in this 
case that prohibition was necessary in the stated sense for the protection or 
preservation of the integrity of the racing industry. … [T]he means adopted, 
prohibition, was not appropriate and adapted to achieve [the protection of 
the integrity of the racing industry in Western Australia] given the avenue of 
regulation in a non-discriminatory manner.
89
 
 
Notably, the last line in the last of the above extracts implies that the law or 
measure under challenge should be invalid if ‘alternative … effective but 
non-discriminatory’ means to pursue the legitimate purpose are possible.
90
 
Thus, the Court now accepts the need to assess the possibility of legislative 
choice.
91
 Sadly, however, the third and definitive level of assessment 
(balancing) remains absent from the reasoning of the Court. Nevertheless, 
                                                 
88 Ibid [101]-[103] (emphasis added). 
89 Ibid [110], [112]-[113] (emphasis added). 
90 Ibid [110]. 
91 Ibid [110], [112]. 
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after Betfair Pty Ltd v Western Australia, the Cole v Whitfield saving test for 
section 92 is only one level away from robust proportionality. 
Notwithstanding its refusal to balance the relative significance of the 
protected interest against the legitimate purpose pursued by the law or 
measure, the Court did refer to the ‘practical effect’ of the law under 
challenge.
92
 Clearly, the period between the case of Cole v Whitfield in 1988 
and the case of Betfair Pty Ltd v Western Australia in 2008 moderated the 
persistent concern with purpose that the Court had earlier shown. At least the 
Court now formally recognises the effect of a law or measure under challenge 
as a legitimate consideration in the application of the saving test for section 
92: 
 
[A] law the practical effect of which is to discriminate against interstate 
trade in a protectionist sense is not saved by the presence of other objectives 
such as public health which are not protectionist in character.
93
 
 
Before Betfair Pty Ltd v Western Australia, the Court did not refer to the 
effect of the law or measure under challenge in its reasons for fear of 
departure from the purposive saving test that Cole v Whitfield had dictated for 
section 92. It is true that the determination of the facts in cases such as 
Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia compelled the Court to assess, 
albeit under cover, the effect of the law or measure under challenge; but the 
Court would never do so openly. Betfair Pty Ltd v Western Australia was a 
refreshingly different case. Hence, the Court concluded: 
 
The effect of the legislation of Western Australia is to restrict what 
otherwise is the operation of competition in the stated national market by 
means dependent upon the geographical reach of its legislative power within 
and beyond the State borders. This engages s 92 of the Constitution.
94
 
 
The Court even admitted that the invocation of non-protectionist purposes 
would no longer save a law from invalidity under section 92 if its effect were 
indeed protectionist: 
 
The Commonwealth, as intervener, submitted that it is sufficient for validity 
of a law if one of several objectives is non-protectionist. That submission is 
inconsistent both with Castlemaine Tooheys and with the United States 
decisions before federation which influenced the framing of s 92. If 
accepted, the Commonwealth submission would impermissibly weaken the 
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force of the imperative demand of s 92. It would do so by allowing to stand 
legislation which imposes upon interstate trade a discriminatory burden of a 
protectionist kind, merely because of the presence of other objectives.
95
 
 
Hopefully, another 20 years will not elapse before the High Court of 
Australia applies what is now a European saving test for section 92 of the 
Australian Constitution. 
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